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Abstract 
In case of behavior analysis of a malware, categorization of malicious files is an essential part after malware 
detection. Numerous static and dynamic techniques have been reported so far for categorizing malwares. 
This research work presents a deep learning based malware detection (DLMD) technique based on static 
methods for classifying different malware families. The proposed DLMD technique uses both the byte and 
ASM files for feature engineering and thus classifying malwares families. First, features are extracted from 
byte files using two different types of  Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). After that, important 
and discriminative opcode features are selected using a wrapper-based mechanism, where Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) is used as a classifier. The idea is to construct a hybrid feature space by combining the 
different feature spaces in order that the shortcoming of a particular feature space may be overcome by 
another feature space. And consequently to reduce the chances of missing a malware. Finally, the hybrid 
feature space is then used to train a Multilayer Perceptron, which classifies all the nine different malware 
families. Experimental results show that proposed DLMD technique achieves log-loss of 0.09 for ten 
independent runs. Moreover, the performance of the proposed DLMD technique is compared against 
different classifiers and shows its effectiveness in categorizing malwares. The relevant code and database 
can be found at https://github.com/cyberhunters/Malware-Detection-Using-Machine-Learning. 
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1. Introduction 
Malware can be considered as any software that is intentionally designed for the purpose of damaging a 
computer, server or any network [1]. Early day malwares were not encrypted using complex cipher 
algorithms and thus were easily detected and classified by cross-matching some piece of code. However, 
with the recent concepts of polymorphism and metamorphism like obfuscation, malware classification 
becomes a challenging and tedious task. Polymorphic malware exploits an encryption algorithm, which 
encrypts the code each time it iterates, while the encryption key remains constant which makes it easier to 
detect [2]. In comparison, Metamorphic malware which not only encrypts the code each time it iterates but, 
also change its encryption key, which makes it hard to detect [3]. It is observed that the total number of 
instances per day is growing drastically over the years and thus manual inspection of malware analysis is 
considered ineffective. One of the main reasons for the generation of high volume of malware samples is the 
extensive use of obfuscation techniques by malware developers, which means that malicious files from the 
same malware family (i.e. similar code and common origin) are constantly modified and/or obfuscated. 
Therefore, a generalized Machine Learning based malware analysis is considered an effective solution, and 
thus can perform well on unseen samples. However, during training static [4] and dynamic [5] analysis are 
used for malware detection and classification. Static methods usually examine the code (assembly or 
machine) of the malware without its execution [6]. Whereas, in dynamic methods, the behavior of malware 
is monitored during its execution phase [7]. Both types of analysis have their own drawbacks. For example, 
in dynamic analysis, the susceptibility in the code cannot be dug out at the exact location, while static 
techniques do this job very well. On the other hand, advantage of static analysis is that it can detect malware 
before its execution. Dynamic techniques allow us to regain control of infected systems, which is not 
possible in static analysis. In malware analysis, classification of malware is important because categorizing 
various kinds of malware is important to know that how they can contaminate personal computers, the risk 
level they pose and how to defend them. In the case, a malware is detected, it is assigned to the most 
appropriate malware family through a classification mechanism. There are numerous approaches ways for 
detecting malware in the wild however, detecting a zero-day malware is still a challenging task.  
In literature, different malware classification techniques are reported. In Pascanu et al. [8] approach, 
Recurrent Neural Network and Echo State Network are used as feature extractor. After that, classifier finally 
detects the malicious malware. In Milosevic’s work, clustering and classification based approach is used, 
whereby good results in terms of precision and recall rate are achieved [9]. In order to protect the computer 
user against automatically generated malware, Dahl et al. [10] proposed an interesting malware 
classification technique. In Dahl’s technique random projection technique is used to reduce the 
dimensionality of the input data. Finally, an ensemble of neural networks is trained, which reduced the error 
rate up to 0.42% . Kinable et al. [11] proposed a cal graph based clustering technique  in order to detect real 
malware instances. In their method, analyzers extract various characteristics from the program syntax and 
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semantics such as operation codes and function call graph from the disassembled code, or string signatures 
and byte code n-grams from the hexa code, or different structural characteristics from the PE header, such as 
dependencies between APIs and DLLs[12]. Some other works [13] also explored the analysis of metadata 
such as the number of bitmaps, the size of import and export address tables beside the PE header’s content. 
Cakir et al. [14] used only the assembly code and reported the log loss in the range of 0.06 to 0.03 on BIG 
2015 by excluding the 5
th
 class. They used Word2vec [15] for feature representation and gradient boosting 
machine. On the other hand, Microsoft research group [16] presented a neural network based approach for 
malware analysis. During detection phase, function calls and call graph based features are considered as 
important features, which resulted in detection accuracy of more than 90%. Cesare et al. [17] tried to solve 
the problem for malware encryption. Nowadays, most of the malware are using encryption or other 
obfuscation techniques. For malware, two different approaches are used to solve the encryption problem. 
The first approach is to decrypt or decode the malware binary. Second is to calculate entropy, which 
increases as compression ratio increases. This change in entropy can result in detection or classification of 
malware binary. Schultz et al. [18] used DLL function, system calls, special characters as features for 
malware classification. These features were extracted form byte file as strings. 
There are many static as well as dynamic analysis based classification techniques that have been reported for 
development of efficient malware classification system [19]–[28]. Amose et al. [19] evaluated the 
performance of different machine learning classifiers on android based dynamic malware detection. 
Similarly, Anderson et al. [20] also used dynamic analysis for malware detection. Anderson’s approach is a 
graph based malware detection technique, which is tested on different malware classification related 
problems. Petsas et al. [22] presented different analysis techniques. In Petsas’s technique information related 
to sensors, complexities related to virtual machine, and static properties are used for detecting android 
malware. Schmidt et al. [23] performed static analysis by extracting function calls in android environment. 
Then, lists of function calls and malware executables are compared and then classification is performed . 
 Malware classification based on deep learning are also reported in literature. Kalash et al. [25] used CNN 
for malware detection. In Kalash’s technique, Maling and Microsoft dataset are used to check the 
effectiveness of their method. First binary files of malwares are converted into image form, whereby 
grayscale images are provided as input to CNN. Their technique achieved an accuracy of 99.17 and 98.52 on 
Microsoft and Maling datasets respectively. In order to detect the zero day malware attacks, Kims et al. [26] 
proposed an adversarial learning based detection system. In Kims’s technique fake malwares are generated 
using Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [30]. Before the training of GAN, deep autoencoder learns 
the generic features from data and then the knowledge is transferred to GAN in order to gain stability within 
the trained network. Similarly, another deep learning based malware generation and detection scheme is 
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reported by David et al. [27] . In David’s technique, invariant and compact representation of malware is 
learned using deep belief network in combination with stacked denoising autoencoders .  
In this work, a hybrid approach is used for detecting different malware families within BIG 2015 dataset 
[28]. BIG 2015 dataset has become the benchmark for malware analysis and different techniques are 
exploited on this dataset.  Lee et al. [29] proposed instruction to the vector representation of assembly code 
and text-CNN for classification of malware. Lee’s approach can detect the intrusion without execution of 
virus and thus not doing any harm to the system. They created their own dataset using Juliet. Similarly, 
Temesguen Kebede et al. [31] use only byte file of viruses. They first convert them to images and train 
different autoencoders for the purpose of pretraining.  Pretrained encoders are then concatenated with the 
softmax layer and fine-tuning is performed. The reported  accuracy was 99.15% on the BIG 2015 dataset, 
but they had excluded the 5
th
 malware family. In another malware detection  approach, Ahmadi et al. [32] 
used both asm and byte files and reported an accuracy of 98.76% and log loss of 0.0094 on BIG 2015. Drew 
et al. [33] also used BIG 2015 and reported an accuracy of 98%. Their goal is to show how gene sequence 
classifier can be used for malware classification and how fast it works as compared to other hybrid 
techniques. Family classification is another important part in BIG15 dataset, because distinguishing between 
malware families is essential for a better understanding of how they can infect computer and devices, the 
threat level they pose, and how to protect against them. Different machine learning techniques have been 
used so far for malware family classification. Some use opcodes or instructions of assembly code to predict 
representative classes and some make images of machine language code to classify given malware, while 
other use hybrid approaches. In the proposed DLMD technique, first a, hybrid dataset is generated using 
deep learning based feature extraction and wrapper based feature selection echnique. Diverse hybrid feature 
space is information rich because, in propose DLMD work information extracted from multiple feature 
spaces brings diversity within the hybrid feature representation, and helps to classifies different malware 
families. BIG 2015 dataset is used for evaluating the performance of the proposed DLMD hybrid malware 
classification based approach. Key features of our approach are: 
 SVM is used to select informative feature space from the ASM file. 
 CNN autoencoder is used for feature extraction from the byte file. 
 Hybrid feature space is generated from extracted and selected feature spaces, which helps in 
overcoming the deficiencies associated with different feature spaces. 
 Final classification of malware families using an ANN. 
2. Proposed DLMD technique for malware classification 
The proposed DLMD technique detects different malware families provided in BIG15 malware detection 
related dataset. The dataset contains both byte and asm files against nine different malware families. 
Therefore, the proposed DLMD methodology used both byte and asm files of the dataset for feature 
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engineering. First, two deep CNNs are used to extract features from byte file. Whereas, wrapper based 
feature selection technique is applied on asm file for the purpose of selecting informative features[34]. After 
that, hybrid dataset is created by combining all the selected and extracted features. In the end, hybrid feature 
space is used to train the Multilayer perceptron, which finally classifies the nine different malware families. 
Block diagram of the proposed DLMD technique is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Proposed DLMD technique 
2.1 Background related to Deep learning model used in DLMD technique 
In proposed DLMD technique different deep learning models are used to improve the input feature 
representation. Details related to these models are discussed in below mentioned subsections. 
2.1.1 CNN 
CNN a special type of ANN, which works on the principle of local connectivity. Hence, they can exploit 
local correlation by ensuring local connectivity between neurons of adjacent layers. Convolutional layers are 
the building block of CNN. During training, kernel having fixed height and width is convolved through the 
whole matrix of input and output matrix is generated.  During training, kernels are evolved automatically 
through backpropagation algorithm. Hence, the output is the results of the convolved kernel at each position 
in the input matrix.Following are the major steps of any generic CNN architecture[35][36]: 
1) Convolve learnable filters on the input matrix 
2) Apply pooling and activation on the resulted values 
3) Apply standard ANN to the features resulted by step 2 
Pooling is another important layer within CNN architecture. Pooling layers within CNN introduces 
nonlinear downsampling. Different versions of pooling layer include min, max, and average. Maximum 
pooling is used widely due to its reduced computation and transition invariance property. After stacking of 
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multiple convolutional and pooling layers, the fully connected layer is used at the end. This layer maps the 
features that are extracted from the multiple convolution and pooling layers to the output. This also adds the 
functionality of the multilayer perceptron in the CNN, but it does not work directly on the input, but on the 
features that are extracted by applying kernels on the input. 
2.1.2 Autoencoder 
Autoencoder is an ANN used to learn a representation of data. It is mostly used for dimensionality 
reduction. They can learn low-level representations of the data and their projection back to the original 
data.Three main components of autoencoder are: 
1) Encoding Architecture that is used to reduce the dimensionality of input data mostly in a 
series of layers with nodes decreasing. 
2) Low-Level Representation of data after it is passed through the encoding architecture 
3) Decoding architecture that has a series of layers with a mostly increasing number of 
layers that results in the projection of data back to original form from low-level 
representation  
In order to bring generalization during the training of autoencoder, L1 and L2 weight regularization terms 
are added within the loss function. Regularization is a basic principle of machine learning. Its purpose is to 
stop the model from being overfitted. It is applied in the minimization of the cost function. In L1 
regularization sum of weights are added to the cost so that they are to be minimized.  Hence, it produces 
very sparse matrices containing many zeros. Whereas, in L2 regularization sum of the square of weights are 
added to the cost function. L2 regularization is also used in the cost function to avoid overfitting.  
2.2 Dataset   
The dataset used in proposed DLMD technique is BIG 2015 published by Microsoft on the Kaggle platform 
for competition purpose. Now, this data has become a benchmark for researchers and cited in more than 50 
papers[28]. The dataset is comprised of 0. 5 terabytes, containing 10868 samples for training and 10873 for 
testing. Up till now labels are not provided against the test sample, so only train data is used for this 
research. The dataset consists of 9 malware families whereas frequency distribution of different families are 
shown graphically and in tabular form in Figure 2 and Table 1 respectively . Figure shows a high imbalance 
between classes in the malware dataset. The class that is most abundant is Kelihos_ver3 with approximately 
five thousand samples where Simda class has the least samples of nearly forty. 
Description related to different malware families is discussed below: 
Ramnit: It steals user credentials such as password credit card information and halts security software. 
Lollipop: It is an adware that shows ads on the browser, it also allows a hacker to monitor user traffic. 
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Kelihos_ver1 and Kelihos_ver3: These are the types of Trojan, that can fully control user pc and spread by 
sending spam email from user pc to others. 
Vundo: It could be responsible for pop-up ads and installing other malicious content. 
Simda: These type of malware snatch the passwords from user pc and create a backdoor for hackers.  
Traceur: Using this malware attack, Author generates revenue by showing bogus advisement on search 
engines. 
Obfuscator.ACY: These are considered as obfuscated malwares and their purpose could be any of the 
above-mentioned malwares. 
Gatak: This is also a type of Trojan which seems to be legitimate but infects a computer with its malicious 
code.      
In BIG 2015 training dataset, against each malware, two files are provided one is byte file and the other one 
is assembly code (.asm file). Description of both files is discussed below. 
Table 1 Number of samples in BIG15 dataset 
Class Frequency 
Ramnit 1541 
Lollipop 2478 
Kelihos_ver3 2942 
Vundo 475 
Simda 42 
Tracur 751 
Kelihos_ver1 398 
Obfuscator.ACY 1228 
Gatak 1013 
 
 
Figure 2 Frequency of malware classes 
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2.2.1 ASM file 
ASM files contain the information extracted by the IDA disassembler tool. This file contains the information 
of function calls and variable allocation. Major sections of an ASM file are comprised of bss and text 
section. However, other sections having information related to secondary functions may also be present. 
Data section and text section are used to initialized constants and the actual code of the program respectively 
whereas; bss section is only for uninitialized data or runtime data variables. Asm files are basically the 
assembly code of the malwares. A sample of the ASM file is shown in Figure 3. These files usually contain 
a different number of sections, and the existence of these portions depend upon the type of malware like 
obfuscated virus sections will be different from ramnit malware. Some of the basic sections and their 
purpose are mentioned below: 
• .text: This section contains the actual code of the malware 
• .data: This section contains the initialized variables or data 
• .rdata: Read-only data or constants that are not allowed to change during the running of the program 
are placed here. 
• .bss: This section contains uninitialized variables, that can be used during execution 
• .idata: It contains the information about the directories or the program that code will import during 
execution 
• .edata: It contains information about the data that malware will export during execution. 
• .rsrc: It contains actual resources of the program. Similarly, text section has the assembly instructions 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 Assembly code of ASM file 
2.2.2 Byte file 
Byte files are the hexadecimal representation of the portable executable (PE) of the malware. It contains 
information related to byte sequence of data, and represented in two hexa bytes. Whereas, addresses 
representing offset of the data. PE file is stored in hexa bytes. The IDA disassembler tool can convert any 
portable executable file into byte file. These byte files are the direct mapping of assembly instructions that 
are present in the asm file. 
  9  
 
The first file is the Byte file. Therefore, if we read two hexadecimal is a single decimal we will get values 
from zero to 255. As the whole file will read as values ranging from zero to 255. This is similar to image 
formulation. As in byte file, we do not have any other tag than the data so we can represent a malware with  
 
 
 
 
 
the 2-D grayscale image mapped from the executable byte file. After making images of all the training data 
we can resize to a standard size. One plus point of the resizing is that it retains the global structure of the 
images that will help us later in classifying the image file. 
2.2.3 Division of Dataset 
For checking performance of proposed DLMD technique, the whole data is divided in stratified manner 
across training, validation and test data. Out of total data ( )D , 25% is reserved as test data )( TESTD . Whereas, 
out of remaining 75% of  D  )( TD , 25% of TD  )( VALD  is reserved as validation data. Similarly, 75% TD  )( TRAIND  
is used during the training of proposed DLMD technique. During training, the proposed DLMD technique is 
trained on training set )( TRAIND  and parameters are optimized on the basis of performance of trained network 
on validation data )( VALD , after selecting the parameters of proposed DLMD technique performance is 
checked on test data ( )( TESTD ). Division of BIG 15 dataset is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Distribution of data 
 
2.3 Hybrid feature representation using deep learning and Wrapper based feature selection 
In the proposed DLMD technique, hybrid dataset is generated by concatenating the feature space that is 
extracted by passing original feature space through two different CNN models with feature space that is 
selected using wrapper based feature selection technique. At the end hybrid feature space is provided as 
Figure 4 Image representation of byte file 
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input to MLP. The details related to selection and extraction techniques are discussed in below mentioned 
sections. 
2.3.1 Feature Extraction using CNN 
In the proposed DMDL technique, feature extraction is performed by using the CNN architectures that 
trained in two different ways. For one type of feature extraction, Convolutional layers of CNN  are used to 
learn the distinct representation of malware to improve the performance of the proposed DMDL 
classification model. Therefore, in this regard a 5 layers deep CNN was trained from scratch on image 
representation (byte file) of 9 different classes of malwares. During the training phase, the best model state 
was saved on which log loss is minimized on the validation data set. All the dataset (train, validation, and 
test) passes through that saved model to get 9 probabilities (nine extracted features) against each malware. 
Architecture of CNN that is designed to extract the feature space using five layered CNN model is shown in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 Five layered CNN architecture  
 
Second type of feature extraction is also performed by using CNN, in such way that convolutional layer of 
CNN are trained using convolutional autoencoders. In this regard, initially, two convolutional autoencoders 
(CAE) are trained on original byte files. Whereas, input to the second autoencoder is the original encoded 
data by the first encoder. In a second phase, pretrained encoding layers of CAE are used as convolution 
layers of a CNN with the addition of two fully connected layers for fine-tuning purpose as explained in 
Figure 7. During the fine-tuning best model state is saved on which log loss is minimum for validation data. 
After training, all the dataset (train, validation, and test) passes through the best model to get 9 probabilities 
against each malware sample as features.   
 
Figure 7 Architecture of Feature extraction with pretrained layers 
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2.3.2  Wrapper based Feature selection  
In proposed DLMD methodology, features are selected using wrapper based techniques in which SVM with 
RBF kernel is used as a classifier for selecting important opcodes from ASM file. For feature selection, both 
forward and backward selection approaches are used. It starts with 10 features and does increment of 10 
(forward selection), after each optimization of SVM, it is noted that once features reach to 120, SVM 
performance started to degrade, so decrement of 1 (backward selection) is done for better results. In 
proposed DLMD technique, 116 features are selected using wrapper based feature selection technique. 
Feature selection using wrapper based technique is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 Wrapper based feature selection technique 
 
2.4  Classification of malware families on the hybrid dataset using MLP 
After feature selection and extraction, the hybrid dataset is generated by concatenating nine features 
extracted through two different CNN based feature extractors (total 18 features) with 116 selected opcodes 
(selected using wrapper based technique). After that parameters of a multi perceptron is optimized on the 
normalized hybrid dataset 
3. Implementation Details 
All experimental work and simulations related to the proposed work was performed on the Desktop 
computer having 61.1 GiB memory, Intel Core i7-6700 CPU@ 3.40GHzx8, GeForce GTX 1070/PCIe/SSE2 
and disk memory 919.9 GB; The Operating system used was Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The major framework used 
for the project is Anaconda and for deep learning is Pytorch. 
3.1  Parameter setting of proposed DLMD technique 
In the proposed DLMD technique, two different types of  CNN are used as feature extractors. Therefore, in 
this regard a 5 layers deep CNN was trained from scratch on image representation (byte file) of 9 different 
classes of malware. During the training phase, the best model state was saved on which log loss is minimum 
on the validation dataset. The parameters that are optimized during training are shown in Table 2. Whereas, 
details related to the architecture of CNN are discussed in Table 3. 
Second type of feature extractor used in the proposed DLMD work is CNN whose layers are based on CAE. 
The parameters that are selected during optimization are shown in Table 4. The architecture of  both 
autoencoders and CNN with pretrained CAE layers are shown below in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7.   
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Table 2 Parameters of CNN 
Parameters value 
layers 5 
epochs 30 
Batch size 20 
Learning rate 0.001 
 
Table 3 Architecture of CNN 
Layers Kernal_size Filters Input Output 
1
st
 2D conv 3x3 64 32x32x1 32x32x64 
LeakyRelu   32x32x64 32x32x64 
Maxpool2D 2x2  32x32x64 16x16x64 
Batch_norm   16x16x64 16x16x64 
2
nd
 2D conv 3x3 128 16x16x64 16x16x128 
LeakyRelu   16x16x128 16x16x128 
Maxpool2D 2x2  16x16x128 8x8x128 
Batch_norm   8x8x128 8x8x128 
3
rd
 2D conv 3x3 256 8x8x128 8x8x256 
LeakyRelu   8x8x256 8x8x256 
Maxpool2D 2x2  8x8x256 4x4x256 
Batch_norm   4x4x256 4x4x256 
4
th
 2D conv 3x3 512 4x4x256 4x4x512 
LeakyRelu   4x4x512 4x4x512 
Maxpool2D 2x2  4x4x512 2x2x512 
Batch_norm   2x2x512 2x2x512 
5
TH
 2D conv 3x3 1024 2x2x512 2x2x1024 
LeakyRelu   2x2x1024 2x2x1024 
Batch_norm   2x2x1024 2x2x1024 
1
st
 Linear layer   2x2x1024 1000 
LeakyRelu   1000 1000 
2
nd
 Linear layer   1000 500 
LeakyRelu   500 500 
3
rd
 Linear layer   500 9 
Softmax   9 9 
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Table 4 Parameters of convolutional autoencoder 
Parameters value 
Weight decay 0.00001 
epochs 100 
Batch size 20 
Learning rate 0.001 
 
Table 5 Architecture of 1st autoencoder 
 Layers Kernal_size Filters Stride Padding Input Output 
 
Encoding 
layer 
2D conv 3x3 128 1 1 32x32x1 32x32x128 
Relu     32x32x128 32x32x128 
Maxpool2D 2x2  2  32x32x128 16x16x128 
Decoding 
layer 
ConvTranpose 2x2 1 2  16x16x128 32x32x1 
Relu     32x32x1 32x32x1 
 
Table 6 Architecture of 2
nd
 CNN 
 Layers Kernal_size Filters Stride Padding Input Output 
 
Encoding 
layer 
2D conv 3x3 128 1 1 16x16x128 16x16x256 
Relu     16x16x256 16x16x256 
Maxpool2D 2x2  2  16x16x256 8x8x256 
Decoding 
layer 
ConvTranpose 2x2 128 2  8x8x256 16x16x128 
Relu     16x16x128 16x16x128 
 
Table 7 Architecture of CNN with pretrained layers 
Layers Input Output 
1
st
 encoder layer 32x32x1 16x16x128 
2
nd
 encoder layer 16x16x128 8x8x256 
Linear layer 8x8x256 500 
Relu 500 500 
Linear layer 500 9 
Softmax 9 9 
 
4. Performance Evaluation Measures 
In the proposed DLMD technique, log loss is used as an as an evaluation measure. Log loss is the cross-
entropy between correct labels and predicted labels. The exact formula for the log loss evaluation has been 
shown in equation 1. 
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1 1
1
log( )
N M
ij ij
i j
Logloss y
N

 
          (1) 
Here, N is the number of samples and M is the number of classes. y represents the true label of the class and 
ρ is the probability of the given sample. Log that is mentioned in the above formula is Natural Logarithm. 
Accuracy is another evaluation measure used for evaluating the performance of proposed DLMD technique. 
Mathematically accuracy can be defined as below: 
                                                                    TP TN
TP FP TN FN

  
                                                                               (2) 
In the above equation TP and TN are the number of positive and negative samples, respectively which are 
correctly classified by the classifiers. Whereas, FP and FN are the number of positive and negative samples, 
respectively, which are misclassified by the classifiers.  
5. Results 
In the proposed DLMD technique, SVM is used as feature selector and simple CNN and CNN autoencoder 
both are used as a feature extractor. Afterward, MLP is used as a classifier.  
5.1 Comparative Evaluation of the Baseline models on Image dataset on Test Set Using Ten 
Independent Runs. 
Before checking the performance of proposed DLMD technique, performance is checked on simple baseline 
classiers. Table 8 shows mean log loss score for 10 independent runs for SVM, simple multi-layer 
perceptron  and  CNN along with the parameters which are optimized during training. Table 8. depicts that 
CNN is performing better with less standard deviation which means that image like features better 
represents that feature space of malware. Performance obtained through baseline classifiers shows that better 
results can be achieved from CNN due to its nature of learning localized image structure. 
Table 8 Baeline classifiers 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Performance of Proposed DLMD technique  
Secondly, we applied our proposed DLMD technique on the hybrid dataset. This resulted in less class 
biasness as shown in the confusion matrix and decreased log loss. SVM and CNN resulted in better feature 
selector and extractor respectively. Table 9 shows the performance of proposed DLMD technique in terms 
of Log loss and accuracy against ten independent runs. 
Model Parameters Mean log loss Std 
SVM (Linear) C=1 0.8948 0.0122 
SVM (RBF) C=10, gamma=0.1 0.1882 0.0069 
MLP 3 Layer MLP (1000,500,100) 0.2828 0.0087 
CNN Conv 3, Pool 3, Linear 2 0.1514 0.006 
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Table 9 Performance of proposed DLMD technique  
 
 
Confusion matrix for the above-applied approach is as below. It can be clearly seen that it is not biased 
toward most of the classes as seen in the case of SVM where most of the misclassified samples were 
assigned to first class. 
Table 10 Confusion matrix 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
C1 367 1 0 3 0 4 0 7 1 
C2 0 610 2 1 0 2 1 3 0 
C3 0 1 734 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C4 0 0 0 116 0 1 0 1 0 
C5 0 1 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 
C6 2 2 0 0 1 174 0 6 2 
C7 0 0 1 0 0 0 97 0 1 
C8 9 5 0 3 0 2 0 284 3 
C9 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 250 
The experiment result shows that our proposed approach achieved lower log loss with good confusion 
matrix as compared with other base-line classifier and selected feature space is more effective and helpful 
for classification of malware families. 
5.3 Comparison of the Proposed method with Existing Techniques and our baseline models 
During experiment, 25% of total data is reserved as test data for checking the performance of proposed 
DLMD technique with commonly used baseline classifiers. However, for checking the performance 
comparison of proposed DLMD technique with Drew’s technique [33] 10% of total data is used as test data, 
because in Drew’s work 10% of data is reserved as test data. 
 Table 11 shows the performance comparison of proposed DLMD  (with different ratio of test data) with 
SVM, MLP, CNN, and Drew’s technique in terms of mean log loss against ten independent runs. Results 
clearly show that proposed DLMD technique is good in terms of mean log loss, also standard deviation 
against ten independent runs is very low in comparison to other classifiers. Low value of log loss shows that 
proposed technique is stable and reliable. As proposed technique is ensemble based hybrid approach which 
Sr. Log loss Accuracy 
1 0.0951 97.6014 
2 0.0964 97.4907 
3 0.0951 97.6014 
4 0.0972 97.4538 
5 0.0959 97.5645 
6 0.0954 97.6383 
7 0.0971 97.4538 
8 0.0957 97.5645 
9 0.0954 97.5276 
10 0.0962 97.6383 
 0.0961±0.0008 97.5535±0.0008 
  16  
 
concatenated the automatically generated feature space generated through different architecture of CNN 
along with informative features selected through wrapper based feature selection technique. Hybrid feature 
space (which contain diverse information ) helps to improved the performance of proposed DLMD 
technique in comparison when only original feature space is provided as input to multiple classifiers. 
Figure 9 shows the comparison of Proposed DLMD technique with other commonly used classifiers and 
Drew’s technique [33]. This figure clearly depict that hybrid feature space generated after feature selection 
and extraction phase, helps to improve to the performance of overall malware classification system. Also, 
mean log loss of proposed DLMD technique is low when 10% of data is reserved as test data in comparison 
when 25% of data is reserved as test data. Comparison of proposed technique with Drew’s technique shows 
that proposed technique is more stable and reliable. 
Table 11 Performance comparison of proposed DLMD technique with other techniques 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Comparison of proposed DLMD technique with other techniques 
 
6.      Conclusion 
In the proposed DLMD technique, byte and ASM file are utilized for generation of a hybrid dataset for 
developing effective malware classification system. ASM files were used just for obtaining the count of the 
opcodes or words present in the assemble source file. This approach is platform dependent but uses simple 
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Model Mean log loss 
Linear-SVM(25%test data) 0.8948±0.0122 
RBF-SVM (25%test data) 0.1882±0.0069 
  MLP(25% test data) 0.2828±0.0087 
CNN(25% test data) 0.1514±0.006 
DLMD(25% test data) 0.0961±0.0008 
DLMD(10% test data) 0.0378±0.0007 
Drew’s technique [33] (10% test data) 0.0479 
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features as opcode count that are easy to extract. Deep CNN is used as a feature extractor whereas wrapper 
based feature selection technique is used as a feature selector for the formation of  hybrid dataset. In the end, 
the performance of hybrid dataset is evaluated on commonly used classifiers. The reason for this reduced 
loss is that extracted and selected feature space from byte and ASM files  provides diversity. The  
shortcomings of extracted feature space is overcommed by selected feature space, which resulted in better 
feature representation for ANN to classify the malware. In future, idea of hybrid feature space generated 
using proposed DLMD technique will help researchers to develop efficient Malware detection system that is 
capable to detect new attacks. 
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